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Why do we argue? To some extent the answer de-
pends on what we mean by “argue.” In the context of
philosophical discussions, inter alia, the word “argu-
ment” refers to the process of backing up a statement
alleged to be true or a proposal deemed to be action-
worthy with statements already known (or thought)
to be true – the process, in other words, of supplying
premises in support of a conclusion. We argue in this
way to make clear to others (or to ourselves) whether
and why a claim is indeed true and should be af-
firmed or whether and why a proposal is indeed
worthwhile and should be implemented. We seek to
enlighten. But there is another meaning of argument
that carries with it another élan. We sometimes use the
word as synonym for a “quarrel” or a “heated ex-
change,” as in, “They got into an argument and ended
up abruptly parting company.” In this statement, we
imply that at some point their arguing became less a
matter of throwing light on an issue and more a mat-
ter of throwing verbal rocks at each other. The will-to-
enlighten had devolved into the will-to-dominate.
Domination tends to foreclose enlightenment and en-
tirely rules out mutual understanding.
       The first challenge to the making of good, logical
arguments, then, is the challenge to keep heat sub-
ordinate to light, to hold the will-to-dominate in
check, to keep argument in the preferred sense from
devolving into argument-with-an-asterisk (argu-
ment*). It may not be easy to do this. In the con-
tentious contemporary context of U.S. politics there
is a lot of argument* going on in public discourse: a
lot of clever name-calling, ridicule that plays to the
crowd, colorful rants, etc. It may seem easier or at
least more fun to take part in this rather than engage
in the serious and sometimes tedious task of careful
reasoning. Moreover, we might be tempted to think
that engaging in such argument* is the best way to
achieve desirable results, such as steering our stu-
dents in the right direction, e. g., in the direction of
endorsing and promoting social justice. What if the
clever use of rhetorical devices can do a better job of
this than the careful thinking that recognizes credits
and deficits on both sides of an issue? Isn’t it better
to win the argument* (and thereby win over the stu-
dents) than to produce sound arguments that few
people are able or willing to acknowledge? If the
promotion of social justice (or any other significant
good) can be better attained by a temporary detour
from the track of genuine argument, why not take
the detour?
       Why not? For one, there is this thing we call in-
tellectual integrity. If we esteem it, we need to main-
tain it. We can’t put it aside, even with the best of
intentions, and expect to get it back easily. Second,
we teach by what we model. If we would “steer our
students” in the right direction, we need to model
what is involved in finding the “right direction,”
and for this there is no substitute for meeting head-
on the two challenges that are internal to good argu-
mentation: the challenge of marshalling true
premises and the challenge of reasoning correctly
on the basis of these premises.
       Providing true premises requires that we get our
facts straight. We can’t argue well without genuine
facts (though, of course, we might be able to argue*
well with “alternative facts”). In this information
age, with its ever more sophisticated information-re-
trieval devices, it may seem to be rather easy to have
an abundance of potentially pertinent facts at our
disposal. Unfortunately, it’s not so simple. The worm
in the apple of the information age is the fact that the
age makes available not only a mound of genuine in-
formation but also a mound of misinformation (in-
cluding the distortions that come from facts divorced
from their contexts). Sorting out what “facts” belong
in which pile can be complicated. We may be
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tempted to un-complicate the task by “cherry pick-
ing” the “facts” we find most convenient for our pur-
poses. Intellectual integrity requires that we resist
this temptation. 
       The problem that arises from the availability of
a surfeit of potential information is complemented
by the problem that arises from the thought that no
information is needed, since – despite an unac-
knowledged limited basis for thinking so – one al-
ready has the truth. This problem paradigmatically
shows itself when students make use of stereotypical
“facts” in otherwise well formed arguments. We who
write this have both seen instances of this in student
papers and discussions over the years, but more so
in recent years. We suspect it is due in part to increas-
ing segregation in many areas of life. Bill Bishop’s
The Big Sort (Houghton Mifflin, 2008) and Robert
Putnam’s Our Kids (Simon & Schuster, 2015) docu-
ment the increasing political, racial, and economic
segregation of communities. These factors, along
with a proliferation of segmented media and news
sources, make it cumulatively very easy to grow up
in this country without having meaningfully en-
gaged any idea, perspective, or person whose expe-
rience doesn’t tightly cohere with one’s own. This,
we believe, puts more, not less pressure on a college
classroom – it is often the first site of engagement
with political difference, and it is our job to model it
effectively. The fact that some stereotypes can be
deeply offensive or insulting to students raises the
emotional stakes in the classroom.
       So what might a professor do when students ap-
peal to stereotypes in support of their views? First,
we can engage them in conversation. Asking them
how they came to these beliefs – what information
or experiences inform their views – can locate them
and also create space for classroom discussion (other
students can articulate information or experiences
that differ). Second, we can model this habit of cita-
tion ourselves; naming our sources of information
when we offer up an argument for consideration
makes this kind of thinking visible. Finally, we can
model inclusion; making a point to compare and
evaluate news media that offer differing perspec-
tives makes us better able to engage with the differ-
ing experiences students bring to our classes.  
        The final challenge is that of maintaining correct
reasoning or “proper form. ”Philosophers differen-
tiate between inductive reasoning (where conclu-
sions can be probable only, because the conclusion
reaches beyond the premises) and deductive reason-
ing (where the connection between premises and
conclusion is alleged to be air-tight, so if one accepts
the premises as true one must accept the conclusion).
Political arguments are often inductive in nature –
we take a small set of information or experiences and
seek to conclude beyond it. But whether inductive
or deductive, when argument fails to be either valid
or strong, it is “fallacious.” (A “fallacy” is not a
“falsehood.” It is not an instance of untrue content,
but an instance of disconnectedness between reasons
and conclusions, of bad form.) 
       Fallacy types are myriad. Suf-
fice it to mention two that seem to
be not only perennial but also par-
ticularly popular in contexts like
ours where contentious argument*
rules the day: the ad hominem
(“against the person”) fallacy and
the “straw person” (or “easy tar-
get”) fallacy. We commit the for-
mer when we either attack the
person’s character or single out
the person’s circumstances as a
way of arguing for the wrongness
of the person’s stance on an issue. For instance, we
might argue against a person’s stance on civil rights
on the grounds that this person has been maritally
unfaithful, or we might argue against a person’s
stance on the issue of free public higher education
on the grounds that she is, after all, a student. But a
“bad” person can still be “right” and a person with
a stake in the outcome of an issue can still produce a
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good argument. Hence, the disconnect between our
premises, even if true, and our conclusion. We commit
the “straw person” fallacy when we distort the oppo-
nent’s position, so that we can easily knock it down. For
instance, we argue against an opponent’s call for “hu-
mane prison conditions” on the grounds that she prior-
itizes “coddling prisoners over fighting crime.” In this
case, there is a disconnect between the opponent’s ac-
tual stance and our interpretation of it. Bad form. We
might add that the straw person fallacy frequently
evinces a powerful convergence between illogicality
and dishonesty. Recognizing ad hominem and straw per-
son arguments when they are offered, and highlighting
those fallacies, can invite students to consider their po-
sitions with greater nuance.
       In sum, the challenge of making good, logical ar-
guments includes the challenge of keeping “win-
ning” subordinate to “enlightening,” the challenge
of marshalling premises that are worthy of accept-
ance, and the challenge of maintaining good, rational
form. Doing these things makes it more likely that
we can talk across our differences in a fruitful and
constructive way.
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